January 8, 2026 · 《Ming Pao》
Since the 2022 Policy Address introduced the “talent attraction” policy, the number of talents imported into Hong Kong has far exceeded the official annual target of 35,000. According to government figures, in the past two years alone (mid-2023 to mid-2025), the cumulative number of talents arriving in Hong Kong has reached 220,000. Conservatively estimating, even after deducting the 30% who may not intend to stay long-term1, 154,000 have still moved in; counting their family members, the total number of new arrivals from “talent attraction” in the past two years amounts to 290,000 — that is, 145,000 per year.
1. With This Wave of Massive Talent Inflows, Is a 10-Million Metropolis Feasible?
Chief Executive John Lee, in an interview at the end of 2024, pointed out that to maintain competitiveness, Hong Kong needs a population of 10 million, otherwise its “talent pool is limited”. Some scholars and opinion leaders — such as former Financial Secretary Antony Leung, Professor Richard Wong, and Professor Lui Ting-ming — have also pointed to the importance of the “talent clustering effect”: talent exchange and interaction can generate synergies that drive innovation and economic vitality. Under this narrative, a “10-million-person Hong Kong” seems an attractive grand vision.
But for a grand vision to land as a feasible policy target, it must withstand scrutiny on multiple fronts: demographic, economic, land, infrastructure carrying capacity, and social-cultural. This article attempts, from a neutral stance, to start from several key questions: (1) What are the theoretical pros and cons of a 10-million-person city? (2) Given Hong Kong’s current population structure and migration patterns, what scale of net inflow would be required to reach this size? (3) Can Hong Kong — in terms of land, infrastructure, fiscal capacity, and social-cultural — sustain population expansion of this magnitude?
In fact, the migration absorption assumed in the “new population projection” is already extremely aggressive. The projection estimates that over this 22-year period, after deducting One-Way Permit immigrants, the average annual net inflow would be as high as 28,000 — significantly exceeding Hong Kong’s historical absorption. In the 22 years from the handover to 2019, after deducting One-Way Permit immigrants, Hong Kong’s outflows exceeded inflows almost every year, with an average annual net outflow of 20,000 to 30,000; only in 3 of those years was there a small net inflow of just a few thousand, and never any year with net inflows of tens of thousands.
2. The Pros and Cons of a 10-Million-Person Metropolis
From an economic perspective, a city’s economic scale and population size are indeed often closely tied to its international competitiveness. Major global megacities have long exceeded the 10-million threshold — Tokyo, Greater New York, and so on. On the mainland, Shenzhen and Guangzhou, with resident populations of around 20 million, have GDPs that have already surpassed Hong Kong’s. If the lens is focused on the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, and Hong Kong hopes to maintain a three-way balance with Shenzhen and Guangzhou, it must actively seek change and find a fast track for development.
However, city size is not “the bigger the better”. Megacities often come with “urban diseases” — congestion, housing, transport, and so on. Building a 10-million-person metropolis requires detailed and comprehensive deliberation.
Hong Kong has entered a phase of rapid aging, with persistently low birth rates and more deaths than births. Without large-scale immigration to top it up, the local population will shrink dramatically due to natural decrease. So even if Hong Kong does not pursue becoming a 10-million-person city, it must still formulate a clear, forward-looking population policy — one that especially emphasises attracting young people.
3. Population Natural Decrease, Outflows, and Unstable Net Inflows
Although inflows into Hong Kong are considerable (mainly One-Way Permit arrivals and, in recent years, sharply rising imported talent and labour), outflows are equally large. The authors explained in a previous article2 that outflows fall into two broad categories: “emigration overseas” and “relocation outside Hong Kong”. “Emigration” requires a visa application and involves a change of identity or nationality; “relocation” does not require a visa application and does not involve a change of identity or nationality. For example, Hong Kong people moving to the mainland for work or retirement, or Hong Kong residents holding foreign passports relocating from Hong Kong to the country of that passport, are cases of relocation rather than emigration.
Because “relocation” does not require any special application and the cost is far lower than “emigration”, it is much more common. Currently an estimated 840,000 Hong Kong people live long-term on the mainland, and another 600,000 or more are settled overseas. On top of that, the people currently living in Hong Kong who hold foreign passports or overseas residency rights account for around 10% to 15% of the total population — roughly 700,000 to 1 million. These three groups frequently travel between Hong Kong and elsewhere, creating instability in Hong Kong’s population.
Historical experience shows that whenever the social climate or political outlook becomes uncertain, outflows of Hong Kong people accelerate; but whenever the outlook improves or new opportunities arise, Hong Kong people overseas may return. Hong Kong’s population change is highly sensitive to economic prospects, geopolitics, and the regional competitive environment — it is inherently highly unstable.
This instability has already shown up in the past two years. The authors pointed out in another article on this page3 that from mid-2023 to mid-2025, the total inflow to Hong Kong surged to 450,000 thanks to the strong performance of the “talent attraction” policy, but outflows of Hong Kong residents also rose rapidly, reaching 426,000, leaving net inflow at just 24,000. In the same period, natural decrease was around 33,000. As a result, even though the talent drive far exceeded expectations, the total population in these two years still declined slightly — by about 9,000 (a drop of 0.1%).
Therefore, to assess how far Hong Kong currently is from a “10-million-person city”, we must first project future inflows and outflows to estimate the scale of “net inflow”. Unless the scale of “net inflow” is large enough to offset natural population shrinkage, the total population will continue to fall. Projecting future “net inflow” is extremely difficult, because it is essentially the difference between two large numbers — “inflow” and “outflow”. Even a change of just a few percentage points in either can cause huge swings in “net inflow”. By comparison, natural population change is easier to project, because birth and death rates are relatively stable and predictable.
4. 2026 to 2046: Using the Official Population Projection as a Framework
This article uses a time frame from 2026 to 2046, a 20-year horizon. On one hand, the Census and Statistics Department’s Hong Kong Population Projections 2022–2046 (“Population Projections”) uses 2046 as the boundary; on the other, 2046 is one year shy of the Basic Law’s “50 years unchanged” milestone of 2047, and also close to the country’s “second centenary” goal of 2049 — both carrying symbolic weight.
According to the Population Projections, the local population will naturally decrease by about 700,000 over these 20 years (deaths exceeding births by some 700,000). In other words, if there were zero migration in or out — net inflow of zero — the 2046 population would only be about 6.80 million. Therefore, if the policy target is to reach 10 million by 2046, the cumulative net inflow over these 20 years must reach about 3.2 million (10 million minus 6.80 million), or around 160,000 per year. This figure is far above the actual level of net inflow in recent years and would be hard to achieve.
5. The Net Inflow a 10-Million Metropolis Requires Far Exceeds Today’s Levels
Hong Kong’s inflow population can be broadly divided into three categories: One-Way Permit arrivals, foreign domestic helpers, and “others” (covering various talent schemes, imported labour arrangements, and so on). According to the Population Projections, One-Way Permit and foreign domestic helper inflows are relatively stable, totalling around 47,000 per year. To reach an annual net inflow of 160,000, the “other net inflow” (imported talent and labour minus outflows of Hong Kong residents) would need to be 113,000 per year.
However, between 1997 and 2019 — a span of 22 years — the average annual “other net inflow” was negative 32,000, meaning Hong Kong people’s outflows exceeded imported talent and labour by 32,000 per year on average. In the most recent two years (mid-2023 to mid-2025), even though Hong Kong’s “talent attraction” results far exceeded targets, with rising outflows of Hong Kong residents running in parallel, “other net inflow” was around negative 39,000 per year.
The authors judge that it is difficult for Hong Kong’s “other net inflow” to shift from the recent level of negative 39,000 per year to the 113,000 per year required for a 10-million-person city. Hong Kong’s recent level of imported talent and labour is already very high, and substantially increasing it further from this high base is not easy. In the longer term, Hong Kong is a small economy with a limited ability to create the high-salary jobs that would attract high-level talent; on the other hand, as Hong Kong’s population ages, the number of retirees will keep rising, and the further integration of the Greater Bay Area will further lower the barriers and cost of Hong Kong people retiring in the north — leading to more Hong Kong residents settling long-term on the mainland. Considering the history and future of population flows, pursuing annual “other net inflow” of 113,000 is unrealistic.
6. Hard Constraints of Land, Infrastructure, and Fiscal Capacity
Even putting aside the population arithmetic and looking only at land and infrastructure carrying capacity, a “10-million-person Hong Kong” faces the same enormous limits. The government’s current medium- and long-term planning for housing, transport, social services, and other major infrastructure is broadly based on the Population Projections’ estimate of 8.20 million by 2046. Even though this scale is far lower than 10 million, the planned expansion of the Northern Metropolis, the rail system, public housing, healthcare, and education facilities is already a heavy burden on the public finances and private developers.
Take the once-controversial and now-shelved artificial-island project: its planned capacity was around 500,000. If Hong Kong is to leap from 8.20 million to 10 million — an increase of some 1.8 million — it would need several new development areas of the artificial-island scale. Reclamation and infrastructure investment on this scale, whether in terms of fiscal burden, engineering capacity, environmental impact, or political resistance, would far exceed what Hong Kong can bear today. Given the government’s widening fiscal deficit in recent years, a weak property market, high construction costs, and the financial state of private developers, completing several projects of this scale within the next 20 years is almost unimaginable.
7. Sharp Demographic Shifts and Social-Cultural Issues
Beyond the hardware limits, a 10-million-person Hong Kong also hides risks in social and cultural integration. As mentioned above, if there were zero migration in or out over the next 20 years, the local population would fall from 7.50 million to about 6.80 million. To reach 10 million by 2046, at least 3.2 million new arrivals would be needed — these new migrants would make up about one-third of the 10-million total.
But in reality, outflows of Hong Kong residents are almost certain to continue, and the scale could be considerable. Take recent data: from mid-2023 to mid-2025, outflows of Hong Kong residents were about 426,000 — roughly 213,000 per year. If this outflow pace remains roughly unchanged over the next 20 years, cumulative outflows would approach 4.26 million, leaving only about 2.54 million original residents in Hong Kong by 2046 — just 25% of the 10-million total, with the remaining 75% being new arrivals. In other words, within 20 years Hong Kong would likely transition from a “local-resident majority” to a “new-arrival majority”. Such rapid and deep restructuring of the population is fertile ground for social and cultural integration conflicts.
Looking back, Hong Kong society has seen plenty of friction over new-arrival integration, language and cultural differences, and the distribution of social resources. Properly handling social integration at the scale of 10 million requires very nuanced, long-term, and carefully designed policy — otherwise it will deepen existing social fractures rather than deliver the hoped-for “talent synergy effect”.
8. Rather Than Chasing a 10-Million Population, Re-architect Population and Talent Policy
Taken together, the analysis above shows that turning Hong Kong into a “10-million-person metropolis” by 2046 is impractical — whether in population planning, land and infrastructure, fiscal capacity, or social and cultural integration. This does not mean Hong Kong should not “attract talent”, nor does it mean Hong Kong must accept a fate of continuous population shrinkage. On the contrary, the analysis precisely shows that what Hong Kong truly needs is a pragmatic, steady, long-term population policy focused on the quality of population structure and human capital. Such a policy should include: more targeted attraction of young professional talent and skilled workers, modestly improving the labour force structure; reducing the burden of child-rearing through social policy and encouraging births; strengthening education and on-the-job training to raise the productivity of the local workforce; actively integrating with and leveraging the strengths of the Greater Bay Area to create more cross-border work and life options for Hong Kong people.
With that, Hong Kong would perhaps have a better chance of maintaining real vitality and resilience in the competition among Greater Bay Area and global cities over the next twenty or thirty years, drawing on its institutional and geographical advantages. Whether Hong Kong then has 10 million people will no longer be the most important question; what truly matters is whether this city can let both local and newly arrived residents see a life and future they can realise within it.
(Translation supported by AI)
Related articles:
- Mass Population Movements Test Hong Kong’s Social and Economic Planning by Yun-wing Sung, Alex Ngau
- Hong Kong has Absorbed Hundreds of Thousands of Talents — Why is the Total Population Shrinking? by Yun-wing Sung
